Abstract-Device-to-device (D2D) communications is regarded as a promising technology for future cellular networks, which can significantly improve both the network spectral efficiency and individual user experience. However, the lack of motivation to utilize the D2D links hinders the deployment of D2D communications in cellular networks. We study the cooperative downloading problem via D2D communications, and propose a scheme, termed as cooperative content download-and-share (CoCoDaS), to stimulate the demand of D2D communications by a simple pricing model in cellular networks, in order to offload traffic burden from base station. In CoCoDaS, the users with the same content demand cooperatively download a large-sized file from the base station (BS) and share their downloaded segments of such content with each other via D2D communications. Simulations verify the efficiency of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme in terms of the reduction of the BS's burden on data services and the utilization of D2D communications.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
T IS a common consensus that the wireless mobile data traffic will skyrocket in the next five years. However, due to the limited physical resources, such as infrastructure and spectrum, the current cellular centric paradigm, in which every data transmission request is served by the macro base station (BS), may no longer be able to satisfy the high-demand mobile data traffic in the future.
One promising solution is to offload the data traffic from the BS-centric communication links to those directly among users, i.e., device-to-device (D2D) communications. D2D communications underlaying the cellular network facilitates local communications among users, which can improve the spectral efficiency by resource sharing and thus enhance the network throughput (e.g., [1] , [2] ). In the literature, the key challenge of D2D communications lies in the resource block (RB) allocation and interference control among D2D communications and traditional cellular communications (e.g., [3] , [4] ), in order to ensure the communication reliability. Traffic offloading through D2D communications is introduced in [5] . Although D2D communications has a potential to offload traffic from BSs and improve the network throughput, the users lack the motivation to utilize the local D2D communications, because contents of interest are not usually located where the devices can reach by D2D communications. Hence, Jiang et al. proposed to maximize content sharing traffic via D2D communications by caching popular contents in the user devices in [6] .
Even if the popular content is optimally placed in advance across the devices, users may still be reluctant to exploit D2D communications, as the content downloading from other devices might be largely opportunistic. On the other hand, it is possible to boost users' motivation of using D2D communications via some pricing mechanism.
In the literature, the pricing model is only utilized to control and coordinate the interference among D2D communications in cellular networks [7] . In this letter, we consider a content downloading problem where multiple users demand a file, which is a common scenario that some contents receive multiple requests within a short time (e.g., video clip on recent highlight replays of a sport event). Thus, a novel Cooperative Content Download-and-Share (CoCoDaS) scheme is proposed to offload traffic during the content downloading, with a pricing model that promotes user cooperation with each other via D2D links. Instead of multihop D2D communications, our proposed CoCoDaS is a two-hop content downloading scheme, namely content downloading via the cellular link, and content sharing through D2D communications. The intuition of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme is to divide a large-sized content into segments evenly and then allocate each segment to respective user in a cooperation group via links from the BS to the users. After that, the users take turns to broadcast their downloaded portions to each other via D2D communications. Based on the scheme described above, we introduce a linear pricing model to charge each user in terms of the traffic data size served by the BS, which can be regarded as an incentive to encourage users to cooperate with each other, especially the ones with favorbale channel states.
However, if all users in the network cooperate to download the content of interest, the quality of service may not be satisfied due to the potential large delay for one-by-one content sharing among all the users. Hence, we formulate the optimization problem to cluster users into several cooperation groups (coalition), taking both cost and delay of users into consideration. By assuming that the users are rational, we model the user clustering problem as a coalition formation process, where a user chooses to join a coalition or to behave 1558-2558 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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as a single entity depending on whether its utility can be effectively improved. In addition, the user that requests to join in a group will be accepted by the group only if the sum utility of the group is improved. Simulations verify the superior performance of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme compared with the traditional direct content downloading from the BS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A cellular downlink scenario with D2D communications capability is investigated. In the considered cell, we assume that there are N users requesting a same content, where n ∈ N and N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. Suppose that the BS and users transmit with fixed power p b and p d , respectively. Let H n,m and H n,n be the channel gains between User n and User m and between user n and the BS, respectively. The channel gains consist of the distance-dependent path loss and the frequencyflat small-scale fading. The noise at the receivers is white Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 . Then, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver of user n is
Using Shannon capacity formula, the transmission rate at the receiver of User n can be given as R n,m (w) = w log 2 (1 + SNR n,m ), where w denotes the bandwidth assigned to user n and R n,n denotes the transmission rate of the downlink from the BS. In addition, we consider the content request arrival as a Poisson process, and we denote the average number of the content requests within a predefined time window as λ.
III. COOPERATIVE CONTENT DOWNLOAD-AND-SHARE
In this section, we propose a cooperative content downloadand-share (CoCoDaS) scheme in the context that multiple users in a cell desire a same content, which can offload most of the traffic from BS-user links to D2D links compared with traditional direct downloading scheme.
Here is a description of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme: 1) If a user intends to download a file, it first sends a request to the BS and reports its channel information. 2) In a predefined time window, the BS will collect several requests for the same content from different users and cluster them into several coalitions based on their utilities taking both the cost and delay into account. 3) Within a group, the BS will equally divide the requested content into parts relying on the number of users in a coalition and deliver them to each user, which indicates that the BS just needs to transmit one complete file data to each coalition. 4) Finally, users in one group will broadcast their portion of the requested content to users in the same cluster in turn. In this letter, we adopt an orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)-based MAC for the investigated cellular network, which fits the current LTE-Advanced and D2D communications standard. In the MAC design, the total bandwidth is evenly assigned to the involved N users who send content downloading requests to the BS (i.e., each active user will obtain a bandwidth of W/N, where W is the bandwidth assigned the cell). Each user in a coalition can utilize the aggregate bandwidth assigned to the users of the coalition (i.e., |C | × W N ) for both content downloading and sharing. That is, with the aggregated bandwidth of a coalition, each user in the coalition first downloads its segment of the requested content from the BS one-by-one and then shares the downloaded segment to other users within the coalition.
Hence, the delay D i (n) of the complete file received at U n in the i -th coalition is
On the one hand, the transmission rate gain by the aggregated bandwidth of a coalition could expedite the content downloading. On the other hand, the one-by-one broadcasting via D2D links during the content sharing might worsen the delay performance if a coalition is too large. Hence, we also introduce a linear price model, in order to further making the users have incentive to cooperate with each other.
The data downloading cost for each user is charged linearly based on the data size served by the BS, i (n) = μ × B i , n ∈ C i , where i (n) denotes the cost of user n which downloads B i -bit data from the BS in coalition i , and μ denotes the charging rate by the BS in terms of the serving data size.
Actually, the expense reduction by our proposed CoCoDaS scheme could spur users to cooperate with each other, however, it may significantly deteriorate the quality-of-service (QoS) of users, especially the delay performance. Therefore, we consider the weighted sum of both the expense and the delay (1) as the utility of a coalition,
where α and β are weight factors of the cost and the delay, respectively. Therefore, the original utility of the noncooperative scheme for each user is V 0 (n) = −αμ × B − β × B/R nn (W/N). For simplicity, we absorb the parameter μ into α. Hence, the problem can be formulated as an optimization problem over the partition on the users to maximize the total weighted sum of the expense and delay of the users,
where V (n) is the cooperative utility of user U n defined in (2). The partition of N is denoted as P = {C 1 , · · · , C T }, where C i ∩ C j = ∅ and ∪ T t =1 C t = N . Note that the utility optimization problem formulated in (3) is an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem and thus with the growing number of users, the computational complexity increases significantly. Therefore, we propose to solve this problem as a coalition formation process through a suboptimal manner with cut-down computational complexity.
IV. COALITION FORMATION PROCESS
In the coalition formation process, users are assumed to be rational. Hence, the motivation of joining a coalition is that individual payoff should be greater than the non-cooperative one. The coalition partition condition should be satisfied as follows,
Also, user U n who applies to join coalition C i will be accepted, if the total utility of the newly formed coalition C i is greater than the sum of the previous total utility in coalition C i and the original utility of U n as follows,
where V n→t (m) denotes the utility of user U m if U n joins the coalition C t and V t denotes the sum of V (n) in coalition C t . With the coalition participation conditions (4) and (5), the utility optimization (3) can be approximated by a coalition formation process (P , ϒ) [8] , where ϒ (P ) = t V t denotes the sum of all N users' utilities under the coalition structure P .
A. Coalition Formation Algorithm
In this section, we propose a heuristic algorithm to search the coalition structure based on the coalition partition conditions (4) and (5). We focus on the problem of the coalition formation process, in which we intend to form one coalition with a preselected user U s from a set of free users that do not belong to any coalition yet. Actually, our proposed one-coalition formation is to search all the candidates in the free user set whose index is greater than s. The reason why the index of candidates should be greater than s is that we want to reduce the duplicate search, since all the users will have the opportunity to choose their partners first in our proposed algorithm. Note that, the coalition participation conditions (4) and (5) must be satisfied during each candidate search. Furthermore, only the user with the maximal utility can be added to the coalition during the candidate search, as the utility will differ if elements in the coalition are different. Hence, with the newly formed coalition, the candidate search will be performed again until no user satisfies the coalition participation conditions. Then, one potential coalition is formed.
With the one-coalition formation algorithm, the coalition structure is able to be built by performing one-coalition formation on different selected users from free user set. Furthermore, the coalition structure with different initial selected user may differ. As a result, we greedily go over all the users as the first selected user to build coalition structures, and choose the one with the maximal sum of utilities as the optimal. Since all the users have the opportunity to be the coalition beginner, the suboptimization strategy is obeyed and the optimal structure under such strategy should be covered. Algorithm 1 records the details of the proposed coalition formation algorithm.
B. Complexity Analysis
With a pre-selected user U i , the complexity of our proposed Algorithm to form the first coalition is
And the complexity to form the second coalition is
. By the mathematical deduction, the complexity of i -th coalition formation is g( 
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if V and V n→t satisfy (4) and (5) return C t , V t 37: end function of coalitions. Hence, the complexity of a complete coalition formation with a pre-selected initial user is
As each user could act as the initial user for the coalition formation, the computational complexity of our proposed Algorithm 1 is O(N 3 ).
V. SIMULATIONS
To evaluate the performance of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme, we conduct the following simulations in an isolated cellular cell. The BS is located at the center of a regular hexagon with 500-meter-long edges and the users are randomly distributed inside. The Channels are modeled by largescale path-loss attenuation and small-scale fading [9] , where the small-scale fading is modeled by Rayleigh distribution. In simulations, the number of the same content requests is obtained by the realization of Poisson random number with the rate λ and the users' locations are randomly generated.
In Fig. 1 , three approaches, namely the original (OR), the proposed coalition formation (CF), and the exhaustive search (ES), are studied with λ = 8. The OR is the one that every user downloads the content directly from the BS with the assigned bandwidth and the ES approach is to list all possible partitions on the users and find the optimal. As a result, the users are partitioned into two groups by both the CF and the ES with different coalition structures. It can be observed that our proposed coalition-formation based algorithm approaches the optimal one. Basically, the users located nearby with better D2D channel states tend to cooperate each other. Although our proposed CF is suboptimal, the result by CF is very close to the optimal one by ES, but with a significantly-reduced computational complexity.
Total delay (TD) is defined as the time from the BS starting to push contents to the users until all the users in the network receiving the entire content. Fig. 2 demonstrates the probability density of TD differences between the original one (OR) and other approaches (i.e., TD Diff = TD OR −TD m∈{CF, ES, BC} ), respectively. As shown in Fig. 2 , it reveals that the TD of the whole group with our proposed CoCoDaS scheme is significantly reduced compared with the original one (OR). However, the TD of the broadcasting (BC) scheme, which is determined by the worst channel between the N users and the BS, is smaller than the CF. But the expense of the BC scheme for each user remains the same or become even larger in terms of service cost. In addition, our proposed CoCoDaS scheme only requires the BS to serve the coalition for a short time, while the content sharing takes a large portion of TD. Fig. 3 shows that the average delay performance gain of our proposed CoCoDaS scheme as well as the formed coalition size grows along with the increment of request arrival rate λ. When the users are located nearer, the dominating path loss decreases significantly and the D2D channel condition is improved. Therefore, the users are more willing to cooperate due to the reduction of the cost and the improvement of delay performance. Moreover, the users intend to form larger coalitions with the increasing ratio between α and β, which verifies that the utility function design works effectively to represent the tradeoff phenomenon.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, we proposed the CoCoDaS scheme via D2D communications in cellular networks to motivate user devices to cooperate with each other to reduce their expenses and in turn offload the BS traffic, by taking both the cost and delay into consideration. We formulated the problem as a coalition formation process and proposed a coalition formation algorithm to cluster users into coalitions. Simulations demonstrate that the traffic in BSs can be successfully offloaded and the device utility is significantly enhanced in our proposed cooperative scheme, compared with the traditional scheme where each user downloaded the entire content from the BS separately.
